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Capabilities 
- 
From a Relationist Viewpoint
"Closing the capability gap", the programmatic lemma of this conference,
presupposes that there is a rift between the actual situation of many people
and the ideal of seeing them develop their capabilities of 
- 
let's say with the
famous list of Martha Nussbaum 
- 
bodily health, integrity, emotions, social
affiliation and much more. The Aristotelian ideal (based on empirical obser-
vation, not on metaphysics) of a good, a truly human life that fuels Nuss-
baum's approach is based upon an 'empirical essentialism' that focuses on
equality, not on difference as many of her critics do (Nussbaum 1999b: 179).
While these critics end up in cultural relativism, as Nussbaum judges, she
searches for universal validity of her criteria. This is an important discussion
that the philosopher masters by herself. NeveÍheless, the notion of a "gap"
connotes difference; and difference connotes relation. The latter is an impor-
tant category to understand human life, seen from the viewpoint of modern
philosophy (e.g. Cassirer) or social sciences (e.g. Bourdieu) or seen from
most of the non norlh-Atlantic cultures in objection of Western individualism.
A closer look at Nussbaum's list and her classification of 'combined, internal
and basic capabilities' shows that many of her criteria are strongly relational:
e.g. bodily health and integrity, emotion, affiliation, other species, control
over one's envìronment. Finally, Nussbaum herself reflects upon social condi-
tions for the realization of capabilities, which means that she takes into
account social relations.tln terms ofphilosophical theory this focus is repre-
sented in the important (and very Aristotelian) role of experience and a strong
concept of a 'good life' in the capability approach, in contrast to an abstract
methodological individualism of "rational fools" (Sen) or to an equally
abstract liberalism of'state ofnature' or 'original position'.
Taking this into account, the conference triggered my imagination to
reflect upon possibilities to fruitfully combine Nussbaum's 'essentialism' of
human nature with a strongly relational social and ethic theory 
- 
without drif-
ting away into relativism, abstract principles or economic individualism. As
my duty in the final panel of the conference was simply to draw some conclu-
sions out of my own perspective 
- 
the one of a sociologist and theological
ethicist 
- 
in the following I will simply sketch some brief ideas in a loose
order.
This is even more the case for Sen's use of the capability-concept.
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Experience, society and power 
- 
social theory as a means of
ethics
It is crucial for Nussbaum's concept of universal human traits 
- 
condensed in
her list of capabilities 
- 
that these are based upon a non-metaphysical, anti-
Platonist, reading of A¡istotle. Hence, there is no metaphysical 'backstage'
that guarantees the list of capabilities. It is simply empirical observation and
the sorting out of the most constant characteristics that allows establishing a
list of 'essential' conditions for a truly human life.2 In this regard, it is the
observation of human praxis from which the ethical criteria are derived. A
person who shares a contextual approach to ethics will have no problems with
that (but there will arise some problems when it comes to intercultural rela-
tions). A further implication of the empirical approach is that the social con-
text in which the universal human capabilities ought to develop comes into
the focus. This is the case when Nussbaum claims an "Aristotelian Social
Democracy" (Nussbaum 1990). This normative demand presupposes that a
society (and with it the state and the government) is responsible of
establishing adequate conditions for the rcalization of human capãbilities. As
the social science context of Nussbaum and Sen suggests, Social Democracy
is understood as a counter program to neoliberal capitalist globalism and its
way to organize societies according to simple economic maximization, to
foster injustice, to marginalize fhe biggest part of the world's population and
to reject social responsibility of property or even wealth systematically. From
an epistemological point of view, there is something llke a descriptive social
theory3 presupposed behind normative ethic claims. From a contextualistic
point of view this is no problem either. Even more: it can be seen as a chance
to develop an ethical hermeneutics that includes normatively identified instru-
me¡ts for the description and analysis of the social conditions in which capa-
bilities can flourish or not. This, of course, is a circular operation. Bìt,
reflexively done, such an integration of social science expertise into the inter-
play of description and norm is far better than letting preconceptions of
society exert their influence unconsciously upon ethic deliberations. Further-
more, an explicit and well suited social theory can help to frame all the neces-
sary intents to operationalize fhe capability approach in developmental poli-
tics, education, life course related research, indicators for measùrement a.s.f.
very well. If this is the case, the question arises, what kind of theory fits best.
Taking into account that the capability Approach focuses on human 
"on-ditions, action and axiological orientation, a sociological program would have
This is 
- 
in a strict sense 
- 
no statement of grounds, but can be accused of being based on
an eror in terms of Hume's 'is-ought problem'. we do not follow this well kno-wn line of
discussion about contextualistic ethics here.
. . .more developed in the works of Amartya Sen.
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to be actor oriented. This 
- 
and many more traits in capability-logics 
- 
pre-
vent the option for functionalistic grand-theories; especially those without
actors. Equally or even more, Rational Choice and any methodological indivi-
dualism ate per definitionem excluded from the list of candidates. Praxeologi-
cal theories, on the other hand, that integrate 'structure' and actor (Giddens,
Sahlins, Bourdieu) seem to be capable of providing significant instruments
for social analysis as well as for matters of application.
To me, it is especially Bourdieu who provides a sufficiently coherent and,
at the same time, flexible framework for Capability interests. First of all,
Bourdieu's focus on the actors is counts with a highly developed theory ofthe
interplay of internal and external conditions of action. The concept of 'habi-
tus' in combination with those of 'practical logic', 'strategy', 'sense of the
game', 'taste' and 'style' depicts a person as a social being (a zoon politikón,
to use an Aristotelian term) and not as an exponent of formal reasoning or of
rationally calculated maximization (Bourdieu 1911 , 1980). The concepts fur-
nish a wide range of ways to understand how perception, judgement and
action of human beings are incorporated in deep-rooted affective and
cognitive dispositions, influence upon tastes, lead to value ascriptions and
communication, regulate strategies in accordance with objective determinants
and situations, form styles and social coherence, constitute images of the self
and of others, relate individual and collective identities etc. It seems to me
quite obvious that these instruments permit, for example, to develop models
of how capabilities generate and develop (in processes of socialization) in
midst of the tension between dispositions of habitus and the challenges,
opportunities and constraints of the social conditions in a given society.
Second, the focus on actors is intimately connected with the theories of fields
and the social space. Thus, the perspective of subjective disposition and
capability (!) of action is framed by a combined theory of the objective
conditions of identity formation and (individual as well as collective) action.
The concept of 'field' 
- 
together with those of 'game', 'conjoncture',
'power', 'capital', 'investment', 'doxa', 'nomos', 'profit', 'stakes' etc. (see
Schäfer 2011) 
- 
allows to describe and analyze 'horizontal' social differen-
ciation in a way that closely links to the concepts related to subjective
dispositions and action (Bourdieu 1996, 1983). Thus, different fields ofsocial
practice can be dealt with in a more dynamic way than it is possible with
functionalistic theories (including Systems Theory) and in a more structure-
related way than it is possible with Rational Choice individualism. Hereby,
chances and restrictions for the development or realization of capabilities in
specific fields 
- 
like education, law, politics, economics, religion etc. 
- 
can be
framed and analyzed according to the specific logic of practice in that field.
So we can, for example, frame the use of the concept of 'capital' (as in 'social
capital', 'educational capital' etc.) within a broader theory of the objective
and subjective conditions of human action. Moreover, the concept of 'field'
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according to Bourdieu is strictly constructivistic, which means that fherc'are'
no ontologically given fields, but any object ofresearch can be constructed as
a field 
- 
so that its logic of action, power-distribution, chances and constraints
can systematically be focused on. Finally, the concept of field theorizes
relations of power according to specific 'spheres' (Weber) of social
reproduction. And power seems to be a crucial category when social support
and hindrance to human capabilities are of interest. Third, the theory of social
space (Bourdieu 1984) 
- 
together with the concepts of economic and cultural
capital, style, class, culture, career perspectives etc. 
- 
offers another
objectivistic means of framing human action by taking power into account. It
organizes social inequality according to the vertical and horizontal
differentiation. Thus, instead of abstractly talking about human conditions 
-the model permits to locate the actors of interest and their subjective('internal') conditions within a framework of the distribution of social þower.
So their subjective chances of realization of capabilities can be seen in a
direct relation to their objective opportunities and constraints according to the
distribution of 
- 
basically 
- 
wealth and knowledge.a For capability research
this means that social inequality comes into focus as a basic condition of the
realization of capabilities. And beyond this, inequality is theorized as a
condition for and a function of power. Thus, capabilities of given actors can
be interpreted within the framework of objective social power relations. So
research can clearly name the social reasons 
- 
e.g. too big a shale of social
wealth of some actors, in difference to a very small share of others 
- 
for a
positive or negative realization ofcapabilities in different social actors; and it
can name causal relations between one and the other.
Beyond these specifically sociological aspects ofBourdieu's theory, there
are two more that come along with it. First, it has often been commented that
Bourdieu carries quite some axiological load in his social theory, insofar as
his focus on po,wer and social struggle is undergirded by an 
- 
neo-Marxist 
-
option for the lower classes. This is, first of all, an effect of a power-oriented
methodology in the perception of an observer. seen from the viewpoint ofthe
Capability Approach however, there is nothing wrong with it, since one of its
basic assumptions is that power relations that go against the realization of a
truly human life are ethically disqualified. At this point, there is much more
overlap of the capability Approach with Bourdieuian assumptions than with
those of Rational Choice or whatever kind of Functionalism. Second, Bour-
dieu puts emphasis on a "Realpolitik of reason" (Bourdieu 2002; Bourdieu &
Wacquant 2006), sociological epistemology of auto-critique. For the social
scientist it is important to take into account from what social position and
habitual dispositions he or she approaches the object of research. Thus, the
researcher does not remain simply objective, but is himself set into his or her
There are, of course, other possibilities to construct a model according to other sorts of
capital.
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social relation with the object. These critical hermeneutics are of some worth
for ethicists, since in ethics it is even more important to critically reflect upon
the social conditions of judgment.
Human nature 
- 
a relational view
Nussbaum puts very much emphasis on 'essentialism' and a substantive
theory of the good (Nussbaum 1993,7999b:178ff.). I read this as to under-
score that there are conditions of a truly human life that can be positively
named (and thus form a semantic content) and that each and every human
being has a right to 
- 
in distinction to theories that emphasize mere proce-
dures and formal maximization and to theories that favour a strict cultural
relativism. Now it may seem 
- 
according to the impression that render some
passages of Nussbaum's writings 
- 
that such an empirical essentialism has to
be understood in those strong ontological terms of the substance theory in
ancient metaphysics 
- 
and thus exclude any attempt of a modern, relational
understanding ofpersonhood, subjectivity, identity etc. I do not think that this
is the case. If it was, however, I would not deem it necessary or even detri-
mental for a capability oriented ethics, since it would appear as a strong
theory of objective grounds and, moreover, it would bind the statement of
grounds to an ancient idea ofhow the physical and the metaphysical world is
structured. But Nussbaum does not even claim that her list is closed; instead
she explicitly leaves it open to results of new empirical observation. This
means that the list of necessary capabilities for a truly human life can
(slightly) develop according to varying social relations. Moreover, the way
Nussbaum explains the social genesis of what is sometimes called the 'female
nature' (Nussbaum 7999a: 170ff.) indicates that her concepts of capabilities
cannot be understood as metaphysical, but instead as historical and bound to
human socialization. In consequence, the concept of 'human nature' does not
denote something self-contained, closed in itself; something that could be
depicted as a ball or a sphere 
- 
as it would be in classical substance-ontology.
If the concept of 'human nature' in the Capability Approach tums out to be
historical, then there are two conclusions at hand: First, as the items of Nuss-
baum's list break down the seeming 'substance' of human nature into diffe-
rent states and practices of human beings which, ontologically, ate not tfaÍIs-
cendental (platonic) entities. Instead, they are simply states and practices that
make up 
- 
as well 
- 
items of human self description. This does not seem to be
much. However, when a person says 'I am human', (most of) these items are
(somehow) present in this description and therefore they are a personal and
social reality. To untie the concept of 'human nature' from specific metaphy-
sical preconditions and to historicize it according to human experience facili-
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tates intercultural plausibilization. But on the other hand it transposes the dis-
cussion of basic underpinnings and substantiation from metaphysics to
anthropology and history. Second and in consequence, the 'substantive'
(Nussbaum) content of the list of capabilities has to be confirmed in its
morally binding character simply on this basis. Nussbaum substantiates it 
-
following a non-metaphysical reading of Aristotle 
- 
simply by stating that vir-
tually every human being in normal conditions is endowed with the listed
capabilities. So, the statement of grounds and the claim of universal too, are
based on nothing more than empirical experience. The good grounds weaken,
the concepts become relative and the items of the list become vague. On the
other hand, Capability-people have an interest in strong grounds for their
statements. But there is no way back to metaphysics in a pluralist world and
finite history does not produce absolute truth. But there is some chance to
create stronger plausibility and wider evidence for Capability-claims, I sup-
pose: not fleeing the historicist argument, but deepening it.
The (implicit) anthropology of Capability-thought counters 
- 
as far as I
see 
- 
both simple rationalism and (methodological) individualism. It claims,
instead, the importance of bodily, emotional, intellectual and social life of any
individual.s And it is from here that we can historicize somewhat more. While
we keep on ascribing the rights 
- 
connoted in the capabilities 
- 
to each and
any individual, we conceive of individuals as intrinsically social beings in a
quite radical way. Richard Rorty (Rorty 1989) 
- 
in Wittgensteinian as well as
in American pragmatic tradition 
- 
develops the idea of the very self as a con-
tingent network of convictions, knowledge, desires, relationships a.s.f., quite
much in the same way as he conceives of language and society as networks,
too. The network that constitutes the selfis anchored in the experiences ofthe
past, as well as extended to the future by its desires and projections. Such a
network is being woven during the process of socialization. Its texture in
some regions is dense and strong: stark experiences and reflection upon it
have produced deep knowledge, firm convictions and staunch sentiments in
ceftain realms of life; other areas of the tissue are like light and thin gauze:
few experience, dim knowledge and little orientation in other realms of life.
And the tissue has no rim, but it is open to shed old and to tie up to new
th¡eads. And, of course, such a network is finite in a double sense: it never
can encompass everything, catch it all; and it is never complete, but its
weaving disrupts with death. We can 
- 
drawing now on Bourdieu's concept
of habitus 
- 
think of such a network as the entirety of cognitive, emotional
and bodily dispositions of the habitus of a given individual, group, people etc.
These dispositions are embodied hgurations of the persons' experience of the
social world and of the persons' self-experience within the context of social
5 . . . similar to many Latin American philosophers of liberation in dialogue with Kanlian tra-
dition 'Discourse Ethics', e.g. Hinkelammert 1994; see Fomet-Betancotrt 1992a, 1992b,
1994; also Schäfer 2004
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world; and they are utterly social since any individual shares almost all of its
dispositions with a certain amount of other individuals. So all networks of dis-
positions are both individual and collective fabric 
- 
while any individual stays
individual by virtue of its unique combination, integration and processing of
its experience. Such a network of the self of course contains all the expelien-
ces of a person with his or her own basic needs and capacities, the trained
skills and the external relationships 
- 
or in other words: with basic, internal
and combined capabilities as Nussbaum would say. From such networks, their
generation, their interchange etc. it is that a comrnon ethos develops. And of
course the network of any person contains notions of what can be called
'human' 
- 
even if they are distorted by oppression and misery.
It is important for the habitus-based network model of the self that the
dispositions a person embodies during its life can be heavily molded by domi-
nance, violence, injustice, slavery, humiliation etc. 
- 
as Bourdieu often points
out.6 Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1999b) 
- 
in this line of thought 
- 
mentions e.g.
poor women in India, who have interiorized their disadvantage in such a way
that they accept it as 'natural'. Domination has become part of the cognitive,
emotional and bodily dispositions. The networks of a common ethos, thus, are
more or less interwoven by the strong threads of domination that exert influ-
ence on the shared convictions. In midst of given social power relations we
humans weave our common networks of ethos, develop communitarian
morals, reflect upon them and construct ethic systems and, finally, principles
with universal claims. And, of course, we oppose against oppression, misery
a.s.f. in the name of human dignity 
- 
reminding one another of what that
means, among other ways by referring to the Nussbaum-list.
Networking conyictions 
- 
thick and thin morals
'Reminding one another' is a communicative act that presupposes social rela-
tions, interests of the actors involved, cognition and recognition of situations
that call for remembering human dignity etc. 
- 
in short: it needs perception,
judgment and action on a conìmon social ground. The anthropological con-
siderations in the former section also think of the humans as embedded in a
_social environment (politikó) since the human being is a social being (zoon
politikón). Then the community has to be taken into account for the genera-
tion of moral and ethic orientation. However, it would rather be a short-circuit
than a shorl-cut to opt for a normative edition of communitarianism, as e.g. of
Alisdair Mclntyre or Samuel Huntington. Instead, I should like to derive from
our anthropological considerations what one might call a 'methodological
. . . and as the sociological approach presented above facilitates to detect and to analyze.
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communitarianism'. It is methodological in the sense that it makes a specific
premise for work. This is dìfferent from e.g. the Kantian premise in baroque
anthropology (dividing reason from experience), from the liberal premise of
an 'original position' (Rawls) or from the axiom of a free, calculating and
maximizing individual. The anthropological premise is that humans are social
beings and their self can be conceived of as a network, as explained above.
What does that imply for an ethics that is competent to cornmunicate convin-
cingly and for everybody alike the normative contents of Nussbaum's list?
I guess that, even if controversial, Michael Vy'alzer's distinction between
'thick' and 'thin' morals can be usefully adopted to the network-idea. If we
think of communities of people generating conìmon convictions etc., the local
or regional praxis tends to be regulated by a high number of (implicit or
explicit) dos and don'ts. Norms, virtues, values, commandments etc. generate
in the 'thick' contexts of meaning that dominate the every-day experience
(and condenses e.g. in routines etc.). The actors adopt their orientation from
traditions, link emotional loyalties, value judgments and self esteem to them'
The accompanying ideas mostly have a strong semantic or semiotic content -
transmitted by stories, parables, symbols etc. 
- 
and are closely associated to
the concrete daily life. Thick morals are focused on the regulation of 'life
world'-issues; a claim to universal validity normally is made only in a naive
way, if ever. On the other hand, we can visualize thin morals as lighter net-
works with just some thread which, in turn, are quite strong. Historically, they
can be understood as the result of a longer period of reflection upon thick
norm, especially when encountering other cultures with different thick morals.
Typically 'thin' are formal, procedural principles. These abstract from the
networks of thick habitual dispositions and reflexively draw conclusions from
the large amount of seemingly unstructured experiences. Hence it is possible
to think of Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' as a result of a long standing
reflection upon reciprocal relations. Principles recall what historically has
been achieved (Rorty 2001: 186), condensing the achievements in formulas.
J.B. Schneewind sees an important function of principles 
- 
be it the Categori-
cal Imperative or the utilitarian 'Happiness' 
- 
as a self-critical 'moral ambu-
lance'. Among others, the claim to universal validity implies that principles
can easily be used by others in order to critically examine those who emitted
the given principle; they are of reciprocal use. Moreover, to hold on to a prin-
ciple categorically makes one's own behavior results predictable for others
and, thus, produces certainty. Principles generate from the dealings between
people of different thick convictions their interest in the universal perspective.
Therefore they are most useful in (inter-national) political contexts with highly
formalized standards of regulation.
But where are the items of the capability list to be localized, in thick or
thin environments? If we examine the distinction between 'thick' and 'thin'
morals according to systematic criteria, it seems to me that the items do not fit
Capabilities 
- 
From a Relationist Viewpoint 135
in either. Nor does it make much sense to divide the items as to ascribe 'life'
and 'bodily health' to 'thin' and 'affiliation' or 'control over one's environ-
ment' to 'ttri.t'. But we interpreted the distinction between 'thick' and 'thin'
morals also in relation to difierent contexts of practical use: local everyday
Networking between cultures - transversal reason
The theme of thick and thin morals already connotes much of the discussion
about the intercultural validity of the list. Nussbaum sees herself in a strong
contradiction to cultural relativists (Nussbaum I999b: n6ff .). On the other
hand she warns her critics not to misunderstand her universalistic claims as
Nussbaum's (Nussbaum 1999b: 178) self defìnition as 'essentialist' rks!) does not help
very much, since it triggers misunderstandings.
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tions has no other way duce
plausibility. As another lons,
it might be a good idea s the
only point of interest th rela_
tions.
In our
to criticize
and counte
tween the '
life? And isn't it already a universalistic manipulation of the particular, if
someone tries to 'save' it by isolating it? on the one hand, it seims that the
typical Eu nhghtenment tradition, they also
end up in Western principle is not directly
evident in ethical orientati,on it has to enter
into dialogue, compete with other ideas and prove its usefulness within a
network of coexistence and communication. As a matter of fact, there are
See for the whole argument Welsch 1996
welsch 1996. For some reading in a similar vein compare wittgenstein 2009 and the phe-
nomenological wolks ofBernhard waldenfels (waldenfels 19g0, 19g5, 1990) and otheis.
8
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human life. Reason, according to this approach, is woven into the fabric of
se is to build as manY bridges
to different ones: It operates
nt rationalities with an interest
'commonly human' is present,
but it is not connoted with uniformity; and the perspective of the culturally
specific is present, but it is not connoted with particularism. However, reason
itìelf does not hold the majestic position anymore that rationalism once gave
to it. Reason is simply a (very important) capability among others'
Certainty and solidarity - networking among power
relations
The relational approach to Nussbaum's historical 'essentialism' renders
obvious that the iiéms of the list do not have the objective strength To oblige
actors to realize these conditions in their social context - even if we con-
ceived of the eY need
consent to be in inter-
national law ( rganisa-
tions like the caPabi-
10 http://www oikoumene.org/en/who-are-we.html.
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creating plausibility for the capabilities and their claim is a communica-
tive process that operates with cognitive contents, emotional states, social
that the convincing power of human 'essentials' can be fostered by taking
relational operations into account.
Any communication, according
along with an experience of the inte
rules. Communication and its way of
conscience and, thus, under good circumstan-
ces, for the their capabilities, too. I would like
to sketch b ant communicational relations on
the cognitive and emotional level.
(1) Reciprocity is a type of relation that, for ages, has made moral simili-
a regulating notion for social organizaiion.
counter-gift is, since Marcel Mauss, recog-
ation and as a strong means for social cohe-
About the universaì evidence etc. ofcapabilities a discussion is going on; it is not object of
our considerations out of a relationist perspective.
See Mauss 7954 and Malinowski 1922. For economy see Thumwald 1932 Ceremonial
exchange of gifts is simply a special form of exchange. Even modem social theories pre-
suppose reciprocity, even if it is mediated by institutions multiplied by functiónal
differentiation (Luhmann 1 995).
see Thumwald 1934. when we are taìking about do ut des it is a good idea not to under-
score too much the word ut, since this would happen out of a subj¿ctivistic misunde¡stan-
ding.
11
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on socially actor
recognizes n his
schemes of what,
on the other hand, also makes it so easy to gain short hand prof,rt by a
calculated rupture of reciprocal logics). Reciprocity can count on
practical, almost universal plausibility. From reciprocity stems social
iecognition, stable conditions and, in the end, universalistic rea-
soning 
- 
it confirms eac items.
(2) On the basis of simple s developed the so
called "Golden Rule". ,ta initiated by the
German theologian Hans Küng, showed clearly that the Golden Rule
is a good starting point for intercultural understanding. Moreover, the
Golden Rule implies a dynamic of auto-obligation for the actor who
commits to it. Jesus pronounced in the Sermon on the Mount:
"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to
you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets" (Mt'
1,12). This obligation to act in favor of the other is valid, indepen-
dently of the other's response and calculations concerning any
counter-gift. This obligation tums the Golden Rule to be strong and
weak at the same time. It is strong, since such a way to act it helps
actors in a given situation to act counter-intuitively and, thus, e'g' to
find a way out of the escalation of a (possible) conflict. It is weak,
since it can be exploited by others. Believers might be strong enough
in themselves to risk this without any protection. For the general
public and even outright self,rsh people the Golden Rule might still be
attractive, if sanctions protect the rule against exploitation.
(3) The experiences of suffering and solidarity are very intimately inter-
woven lnto the cognitive and emotional fabric of the most particular
cultures (Rorty 1939). At the same time, suffering and solidarity are
the
do
sin
the
eyes of Muslim believers. Both In con-
trast, experiences of suffering, rning of
houses, ihe death of a child, hun invite to
identify with the victim. A sentence as "I know what it means to lose
a child. Vy'hat can I do for you?" is an expression of primordial soli-
darity transcending all boundaries. Here we have the groundwork for
a secular ethic of solidarity as Richard Rorty (Rorly 1989) projects'
Moreover every religion has some account on suffering and soli-
14 http://www.weltethos.org/dat-english/index.htm. See similar: Parliament of the Vr'o¡ld Reli-
gions 1993.
140 Heinrich W. Schäfer
darity, richly expressed by symbols and stories as the Biblical
account of the Samaritan highlights. All rhe religions 
- 
except their
fundamentalist transformations (but up to a certain point even these)
- 
are masters in contradicting the reality of suffering and finally even
death. And they know how to mobilize the power of compassion (e.g.
Metz 2004).If ethics ties up to experiences of suffering, it gets in
touch with the most intimate fabric of feelings and convictions; and
at the same time it always is on the brink to universal consensus. And
compassion in solidarity is something very different from sentimenta-
lity. Acting in solidarity always also means to act out of the threshold
of inter-subjective and objective needs and rights. This becomes
obvious, if one conceives of the Human Rights as a response to syste-
matically produced experiences of suffering and injustice. In this
sense, the universal validity of Human Rights does not stem from
Vy'estem dogmatism but from the mere universality of human suffe-
ring itself 
- 
and the social conditions that guarantee the development
of human capabilities thus become criteria also for judging a sirua-
tion according to the Human Rights.15
baum (Nussbaum 1999b: 186) points out that even in Aristotle's ethics the
powerless are omitted easily. Identifying with the 'miserables' (or at least
with their interests) obliges the ethicist to refer to a social theory in order tojustify his or her judgments. Thus, some fields of debate in ethics drift
towards empirical, sociological reasoning. There are only some few thoughts
that I would like to point out about this drift.
Social science, out of a relationist perspective, can be of some use, when
the debate between Nussbaum's (empirical) 'essentialism' and cultural-relati-
vist opinions arises (N 
.). If
physical but historical way,
stance for 'essentials'; that
the consequence. Individuals cannot be compared without their relations and
positions in their social context; cultures cannot be compared without their
intercultural, social relations on the regional and global level. comparison in
context presupposes that any social action is embedded in social relations.
And these are relations of inequality and power. Hence, to me it seems that it
is not so much of interest, if people of a given culture have the right to do this
l5 The long complex discussion of the relation between Human Rights and Capabilities, how-
ever, is not object of our brief considerations.
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or that. The question is, if they exert power relations upon other people that
these people dislike. And this is the moment when the oppressed people can
claim their rights, for example referring to their right to develop their capabi-
lities. But: this argument still needs to be sharpened. Since there are people
who are so accustomed to being oppressed that they habitualize it and would
not even complain about it (cf. Nussbaum I999b:210). Here, of course, the
ethicist would have to act 'enlightening' this person's situation and line up
with her in solidarity. But this is nothing more than to fight according to one's
own convictions or, in other words, tying up to the network of convictions
and action (which is a network of power relations) in order to weave new pat-
terns.
Power relations, in my understanding, need to be addressed with priority.
But this does not solve problems of substantiation with one strike. It only
transforms them as two gross issues of ethical relevance may illustrate. These
are exploitation and exclusion of many human beings by neoliberal econo-
mics i.e. economists 
- 
beginning with the 'Chicago boys' benefiting from a
torturing dictator in Chile and ending with investment bankers causing by
their usual business hundreds of millions of people starving (to death). All of
this is, of course, a matter of ethics. But it cannot be resolved by ethics alone,
as the comparison between torture and banking shows. That torture is unethi-
cal, even an investment banker would agree upon (even though Friedrich
Hajek and Friedman-followers in the seventies legitimized Pinochet). But he
would not agree upon his responsibility whatsoever for starving people. He
would 
- 
as any neoliberal 
- 
more or less say that poor people are themselves
responsible for their situation; and he would try to legitimize that with econo-
mic and socio-scientific arguments 
- 
not with ethics. So, we are caught within
a kind of double bind. Without a strong theory of social power relations and
inequality behind our interest in justice, we cannot argue the reasons of injus-
tice and the way to justice. And without a strong ethic commitment to human
basic needs and/or capabilities we are not able to substantiate our socio-scien-
tific approach. This means that things inevitably become political.
Thus, the action connoted by the lemma of this conference: "Closing the
capability gap" turns out to be, finally, political transformation."
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